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between the authority and the labor organization. ... 53 in which
the decision of the arbitration board is to be final and binding.5 4
It is submitted that the legislature would have explicitly stated
that the employees of the Transit Authority had the right to strike
against the government if such had been its intention, and so drastic
a remedy, which greatly infringes on the rights of the government
should logically come from the legislature or the people and not "by
the unicameral act of a majority of court."5
LAURENCE M. SMAIL
EFFECT OF PROBATE DECREES OF DISTRIBUTION
ON FUTURE INTERESTS
Decrees of distribution issued after the probating of wills have
the same force and effect as judgments of courts of record,1 so that
persons who are adversely affected must appeal promptly to secure
their rights or they will be precluded from asserting them. The case
of Riddle v. Jay,2 recently decided by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma,
illustrates a situation wherein the failure to make a timely appeal of
such a decree resulted in the plaintiffs' forfeiting a case which they
probably could have won on its merits.
George W. Hughes died testate in 1913. In his will he left to his
wife a life estate in all his property and upon her death the entire
estate was to be divided into as many equal shares as there were
children then living or deceased leaving issue.3 In 1915 one of the
testator's children (hereinafter referred to as the grantor) conveyed
her apparent share by warranty deed to Jay, the defendant in the
principal case. The will was not admitted to probate until 1925,
when, pursuant to an Oklahoma statute,4 a decree of distribution was
issued by a county court. The decree assigned the widow a life estate
in "all the rest, residue and remainder" of the decedent's estate and
'See note 47 supra at 920.
rlbid.
'355 P.2d at 917.
1Chapin v. Chapin. 229 Mich. 515, 2o N.W. 530, 532 (1924); 57 Am. Jur. Wills
. 1034 (1948); Annot., 136 A.L.R. 1180 (1942).
2356 P.2d 1071 (Okla. 1966).
""I hereby give... to my beloved wife ... a life estate in all ... of my es-
tate ... and upon her death ... direct that my entire estate shall be equally divided
into as many portions or shares as there may be children of mine living, or deceased
leaving issue ...... Id. at 1075.
4Okla. Rev. Laws § 6463 (191o) (now Okla. Stat. tit. 58, § 631 (1951).
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upon her death an undivided one-fourth interest to named children
and "their heirs and assigns forever."5 The grantor died in 1957; her
mother, the widow of the testator, died the following year. The
brothers, sisters, and children of the grantor then brought an action
to quiet the title and to partition the realty involved. The plain-
tiffs contended that under the provisions of the decree, the interests
of the living childrein or the issue of any deceased child were contin-
gent upon their surviving the widow; and since the grantor predeceased
the widow, her interest never accrued. Therefore, she could not con-
vey any interest in the property. They further asserted that upon the
death of the testator's widow they became owners of an undivided
one-fourth interest of the testator's property, deriving their claim as
beneficiaries under the will of the testator as interpreted by the final
decree issued in 1925 and not as heirs of the grantor. Conversely, the
defendant contended that his grantor held an indefeasibly vested re-
mainder from the death of the testator until the time of the convey-
ance in 1915.
The majority of the appellate court held that it was bound by the
final decree of distribution, and in determining the rights of the
plaintiffs it would not look to the provisions of the will but only
to the provisions of the distribution decree. In construing the final
decree, the majority held that the widow had a life estate and the
children had vested remainders. The dissenting members of the court,
looking behind the distribution decree and construing the will, con-
cluded that the will gave to the children remainders which were
contingent upon their surviving the widow. In light of this construc-
tion the grantor had conveyed to the defendant a mere expectancy
which, when the contingency failed, could never become possessory.
The court took the position that the plaintiffs must lose their case
on the precedural point that the decree of distribution is not subject
to collateral attack. It would seem that the plaintiffs were remiss in
not making a timely and direct attack upon the decree of distribution
because the county court, sitting in probate, apparently erred in con-
struing the will. The will provision relating to the remainder interest
is susceptible of three constructions:6 (i) a remainder contingent upon
"All the rest, residue and remainder of said property ... to the said [wife] ...
for.., the rest of her natural life, and upon her death to Rella Z. Riddle, Grace
0. Jay, Owen R. Hughes and Emily M. Hughes, each an undivided one-fourth inter-
est . .. their heirs and assigns forever." 356 P.2d at 1075-76.
OSee generally Annot., 47 A.L.R.2d 90o (1956); Annot., 131 A.L.R. 712 (1941);
Annot., iog A.L.R. 136 (1937).
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the grantor surviving the life tenant;7 (2) a vested remainder subject
to being wholly divested by the grantor predeceasing the life tenant;S
or (3) a vested remainder.9
A number of tests for contingent remainders may be applied with
a reasonable degree of efficacy. It is generally stated that a contingent
remainder is created when a condition precedent other than the
termination of the preceding estate is necessary to vest the interest.10
In an instance where the remainder interest is given to children who
survive the life tenant, the remainder is said to be contingent because
the remaindermen cannot be ascertained until the death of the life ten-
ant." A provision for a substitute gift, i.e., one that takes the place of a
prior devise, usually shows an intention that the primary gift is con-
tingent upon the remaindermen surviving the life tenant.12
The probate court could have considered the remainder as one
that was vested but subject to being divested. If the condition that the
remaindermen outlive the life tenant is a condition subsequent to
the vesting of the interest, the remainder is said to be vested subject
to being wholly divested.13 On the other hand, if the condition is pre-
cedent to the remainder estates coming into existence, the remainder
is said to be contingent.14 In Riddle the effect on the conveyance of a
contingent remainder and a vested remainder subject to being di-
vested would have been the same. If the remainder were contingent
on the grantor surviving the widow, the grantee would have been
defeated because the grantor's interest never matured; if the re-
mainder were vested subject to being divested, the interest that the
grantor had conveyed would have been divested when the grantor pre-
deceased the widow.
7 Restatement, Property § 157, comment u-x (1936).
'Caple v. Warburton, 125 Kan. 290, 264 Pac. 47 (1928); Restatement, Property
§ 157, comment o-t (1936).
9
Annot., 47 A.L.R.2d goo, 920 (1956); Restatement, Property § 157, comment f-k
(1936).
"Gray, Rule Against Perpetuities, § 1o (4th ed. 1942).
u"Where a devise by its terms is to a person for life with a remainder to such
of the children of that person as survive at his death the remainder is contingent,
for the reason that it cannot be ascertained until the death of the life tenant who
takes the remainder." Smith v. Chester, 272 Ill. 428, 112 N.E. 325, 328 (1916).
1ln re Constable's Estate, 176 Misc. 216, 26 N.Y.S.2d 967 (Surr. Ct. 1941).
See generally 96 C.J.S. Wills § 947 (1957)-
13A vested estate, whether present or future, may be absolutely or defeasibly
vested. In the latter case, it is said to be vested, subject to being divested on the hap-
pening of a contingency subsequent. L'Etourneau v. Henquenet, 89 Mich. 428, 50
N.W. 1077 (1891).
24Restatement, Property § 157, comment v (1936).
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A remainder that is indefeasibly vested is a present interest certain
of becoming possessory at some time in the future, and it is of no con-
sequence that the intervening time cannot be precisely determined. 15
It is essential that the persons to whom the remainder is given are
presently identifiable'16 and that the share which each is to receive
is ascertained.17 Because American courts favor the early vesting of
estates 18 such phrases as "upon the death"' 9 (which appeared in the
will in the principal case), "after death," or "at the death" are gen-
erally dismissed as referring only to a postponement of possession.
The use of such phrases alone does not usually postpone the vesting
of the interest,20 nor do courts imply from them a condition precedent
of surviving the life tenant.21
Viewing the will as a whole,22 instead of considering isolated
phrases, it appears that the correct interpretation is that the remainder
interests are contingent, being subject to the condition precedent that
the remaindermen survive the life tenant. The will clearly states that
only those children, or grandchildren, if their parents are dead, who
are living at the death of the widow receive any interest in the estate.23
Hence, it is impossible to ascertain to whom the interests inure until
the widow dies.2 4 Furthermore, there is a provision for a substitution-
ary gift, and there is an incorporation of a conditional phrase within
the provision creating the remainder interest. Professor Gray states
that when the conditional element is incorporated into the descrip-
tion of the gift to the remaiddermen the remainder is contingent
n"Restatement, Property § 157, comment f (1936).
IfRestatement, Property § 157, comment i (1936).
"See note 15 supra.
'Anderson v. Menefee, 174 S.W. 904 (Tex. Ct. App. 1915). See also 96 C.J.S.
Wills § 947 (1957)-
"Such phrases are termed "conditional in form which do not add a condi-
tion .... Simes & Smith, Future Interests § 144 (2d ed. 1956).
""Mhe will speaks from the death of the testator, and passes all property
that he was capable of disposing of by will at the time of his death." Wilson v.
Greer, 50 Okla. 387, 151 Pac.'629, 632 (1915).2Simes & Smith, Future Interests § 144 (2d ed. 1956). But see Howard v.
American Security & Trust Co., 84 App. D.C. 135, 171 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
""In construing a will or interpreting the meaning of particular words, parts,
or provisions of a will, and in determining the intention of the testator in relation
thereto, the courts must consider the will as a whole...." 95 C.J.S. Wills § 620
(1957). See Atkinson, Wills § 146 (2d ed. 1953).
2"A gift to a child 'then living' at the determination of the life estate, vests
when the life estate terminates." 3 Page, Wills § 1267 (1941). "Thus, it has fre-
quently been held that a remainder interest is contingent where it is given to the
life tenant's children who may survive him." Annot., 131 A.L.R. 712, 722 (194).
2'See note ii supra.
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upon that element.2 Nevertheless, the county court in 1925 had con-
strued the will as giving the children of the testator a vested re-
mainder,"6 probably concluding that the phrase "upon her death"
merely postponed the use and enjoyment of the remainder estate and
had no effect on the time of vesting.27 Any present construction of the
will is of little consequence because the majority of the appellate court
held that it was bound by the decree of the county court and not by
the will of the testator. Therefore, the interpretation of the decree
rather than that of the will becomes the determinative factor.
Seventeen states require a decree of distribution in order to trans-
fer either real or personal property. -8 The effects of such a decree
are threefold: (i) the will is construed by the court which is exercising
probate jurisdiction;29 (2) the decree relates back to the time of the
testator's death and supports the title of anyone who has taken under
or through one who has derived his title from the will;30 and (3) the
decree is conclusive as to the rights of the devisees and their privies.3 '
A decree issued by a probate court or a court having probate juris-
diction is as final and of the same force and effect as a judgment in a
court of record because such proceedings are in rem32 and are res
judicata as to the matters decided.33 The general rule is that a county
or probate court which has issued a decree of distribution has impli-
Grav. Rule Against Perpetuities, § ioS (4 th ed. 1942).
"-There is little room for doubt that the remainder described in the decree is
%eted since the specific language as to who are the remaindermen, the extent of
their interets and the portions iOhich they are to receive clearly eliminates any
uncertaintv. See note 5 supra.
r'See note 22 supra.
2'Arizona. California, Connecticut. Idaho, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Mon-
tana. Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota. Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont,
Wisconsin. W)oming. See generally 3 American Law of Propert) § 14-43 (Casner
ed. 1952).
""The county court construes ever% will when it deciees a distribution there-
under .... In re Sjurson's Estate, 29 S.D. 566. 137 N.W. 341, 342 (1912). "In fact
the ourt could not assign the estate by the final judgment 'without construing the
will'." In re Brandstedter's Estate, 198 Vis. -157, 224 N.W. 735, 736 (1929). See
generally Annot., 136 A.L.R. t18o, 1185 (1942).
"'Okla. Rev. Laws § 116o (19to) (now Okla. Stat. tit. 16 § 17 (1951)). "IT]he
probate would relate back so as to make valid whatever she has done previousl),
and which, under the will after probate, she would have had right to do." Sutphen
v. Ellis, 35 Mich. 446, 148 (1877).
3'Okla. Rev. Laws § 6464 (1910) (now Okla. Stat. tit. 58 § 632 (1951)): Model
Probate Code § 183 (Simes 1946).
3Krohn v. Hirsch, 8t Wash. 222, 142 Pac. 647, 648 (1914): Ladd v. Weiskopf,
62 Minn. 29, 64 N.W. 99, 1o (1895).
-,"ee note i supra.
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edly, if not expressly, construed the will. 34 Some appellate courts,
however, while recognizing that the county or probate court has the
power to construe a will, hold that the will has not been construed if
the language of the will is merely incorporated into the final decree.35
The grantor in the principal case did not acquire her title from
the decree,38 but it came to her from the testator's will which was
operative at the instant of his death. 7 Therefore, when the grantee
purchased the remainder interest before any distribution decree had
been entered, he did so at his own risk and was subject to the pro-
visions of the distribution decree when it is subsequently entered.3 8
The decree merely interpreted the provisions of the will, but the
force of the interpretation related back to the time of the testator's
death,3 9 and acted to affirm the validity of the conveyance 40 since the
decree decided that the grantor's remainder was vested. The fact that
the supreme court is now called upon to interpret the decree cannot
affect its conclusiveness 1 The plaintiffs recognized that they were
bound by the decree but sought to apply an interpretation to it which
would be beneficial to them, i.e., that the decree gave them a vested
remainder. In holding the remainder described in the decree to be
3MCook v. Cook, 17 Cal. 2d 639, 111 P.2d 322, 324 (1940- See note 32 supra.
"There is no general and inherent power vested in probate courts to construe wills
as a distinct and independent branch of jurisdiction .... Nevertheless, in many
jurisdictions ... courts of probate are vested with power ... to construe wills as
an incident of their general jurisdiction over the settlement and distribution of
decedents estates.... The construction and effect of the will ... are necessarily
involved, otherwise there could be no distribution of an estate...." 96 C.J.S. Wills
§ 1076 (1957). But see Annable v. Ricedorff, 14o Neb. 93, 299 N.W. 373 (1941);
Andersen v. Andersen, 69 Ntb. 565, 96 N.W. 276 (1903); Youngson v. Bond, 69
Neb. 356, 95 N.W. 700 (1903). These cases hold that the Nebraska rule is that a
decree of a probate court is not a conclusive construction as between adverse claim-
ants but is for the information and benefit of the administrator or executor. See
generally 136 A.L.R. 118o, 1185 (1942).
3In re Hill's Estate, 214 Wis. 677, 253 N.W. 787, 788 (1934)-
3°"The title of the devisees does not originate either in the probate of the
will or the decree of distribution that may be or has been entered, but title comes
from the deceased through the will the instant of his death." In re Deschamps'
Estate, 65 Mont. 207, 212 Pac. 512 (1922). See also 3 American Law of Property
§ 14.44 (Casner ed. 1952).
n"The rule . . . is that a will generally speaks as of the time of the testator's
death.... 95 C.J.S. Wills § 629 (957). See note 20 supra.
28Phelps v. Grady, 168 Cal. 73, 141 Pac. 926 (1914). See generally Annot., 86
A.L.R. 400 (1933)-
'*Peter v. Peter, 343 Ill. 493, 175 N.E. 846 (1931).
"OSee note i supra. See generally Annot., 86 A.L.R. 400 (1933); Annot., 48 A.L.R.
1035 (1927)-
"Davis v. First Nat'l Bank, 139 Tex. 36, 161 S.W.2d 467 (Comm'n App. 1942).
